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  4. Religion: There is evidence that religiousness is an evolved capacity. Religiousness has been found to be 0.44 heritable based on twin studies while religious experience and fundamentalism are around 0.66 heritable (Koenig et al., 2005). A variety of evolved capacities would explain the development of religiousness including the tendency to find patterns in randomness and so-called ‘Hyperactive Agency Detection’, wherein we tend to assume an agent behind any inexplicable event (Boyer, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that religiousness developed as a means of reducing stress, especially that caused by an awareness of death or due to social exclusion, and both these tend to increase religiousness (see Lewis & Bates, 2013). It has been shown that the belief that one is being watched also makes one behave in a more pro-social manner, so those that had this belief would have been less likely to have been ostracised by the band for breaking its rules (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). As such, religiousness may cause us to behave in a highly pro-social way or in a highly rule-following way even if this is not rational.

  Modernists

  But let us return to definitions of ethnicity. Secondly, there are the ‘Modernists’. They share with the Instrumentalists the assumptions of cultural and environmental determinism, but they insist that most contemporary ethnic identities — or nationalisms — are in fact ‘modern’ phenomena and that they are not a fixed part of a person’s identity. Rather, they are strongly subject to change. This camp can be roughly divided into four different schools, which we will discuss one by one.

  Social Constructivists

  British sociologist Benedict Anderson’s (1936–2015) influential book Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1983) can be regarded as the best example of ‘Social Constructivism’. In it, he maintains that the modern sense of ‘national identity’, something which has much in common with ethnic identity, is, indeed, very much ‘modern’. There was, he maintains, no strong sense of Englishness prior to the sixteenth century. Most people hardly left their village, dialects were so pronounced that people might have difficulty communicating with others from the neighbouring county, and the cultural traditions in that county, at least beyond church rituals, might even seem rather foreign. People identified, argues Anderson, very strongly with their local area and there was little sense of feeling ‘English’ in England, for example.

  With the rise of printing and literacy and the reading of the Bible during the Reformation, a particular dialect of English gradually spread throughout the country. In addition, as communication improved, local differences declined and English culture became increasingly homogeneous. Accordingly, there began to develop the sense of an ‘imagined community’ of the English: people began to perceive those whom they had not met as part of their in-group because they spoke the same language and held to the same common culture. This model would seem to raise the question of what held the English state together — in the face of foreign invasions and aggressive wars — if there was no sense of Englishness at all prior to the sixteenth century. At the very least, it might be suggested, there must have been some kind of sense of Englishness, especially among the elite, who would have been literate and would have had a relatively greater awareness of those who did not speak English at all. In addition, there is evidence of anti-foreigner — and especially anti-Jewish — riots in Medieval England, and even as far back as the Saxon period a clear sense in which the ‘Norsemen’ were not ‘English’.13

  Economic Constructivists

  A variation of Social Constructivism is ‘Economic Constructivism’. This has been most forcefully advocated by British-Czech philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995) in Nations and Nationalism (Gellner, 1983). This would seem to overcome some of the problems with Anderson’s model, because it implicitly posits ‘nationalism’ as beginning with the elite and being imposed upon the masses by them. Gellner argues that a sense of national identity is a product of an increasingly educated and bureaucratic society. As society became more complex, the ruling class decided that it was necessary to foster a unified state. In order to do this, they had to break down strong local identities, based around folk culture, and impose their own ‘high culture’, which was based around a ‘national identity’. In order to achieve this, they educated the masses, leading to the development of a single language. This not only meant that the masses developed more of a sense of being ‘one nation’ but they could also be more efficiently inculcated with this belief.

  Of course, this raises the question of where the belief in a sense of, for example, Englishness held by the English elite came from. It would seem to at least imply that a sense of Englishness, at least among the elite, was relatively ancient; thus moving us towards Primordialism. If this is not the case, we must assume that the elite deceitfully manufactured national myths and a national past, which seems unlikely because there is at least some historical basis to many national myths.14 Gellner’s model assumes a dramatic chasm between the ‘elite’ and the ‘masses’ and fails to entertain the possibility that sometimes they have the same interests and that, sometimes, pressure can be placed on the elite by a mass movement. Most obviously, ethnic nationalism will often develop within larger multi-ethnic empires, rendering it a threat to the elite. It might be countered that this is spearheaded by a local elite group who are looking to gain power, however.

  Political-Ideological Constructivists

  A variation on economic constructivism is ‘Political-Ideological Constructivism’. Advocated most prominently by British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1971), this model suggests that Industrialization leads to the loss of a sense of time and space among the masses. They can regain this with nationalism and, as such, nationalism is propagated by the elite in order to control them. Not only does this model assume a highly distinct elite and mass, but it raises the question of how nationalism could possibly re-imbue the masses with a sense of ‘time’ and ‘space’ if it had no relationship whatsoever with their previous sense of folk identity. If it did have such a relationship, then this would be an argument for adopting a more Primordialist perspective.

  Marxists

  It may be argued that many of the Constructivist models which we have discussed are effectively variations of classical Marxist Theory. From a Marxist perspective, best articulated by historian Eric Hobsbawm (1917–2012), nationalism and related traditions were invented by the ‘ruling class’ in order to control and mobilize the proletariat (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1990). There are manifold problems with this extreme form of Constructivism. It is economically reductionist, assuming the people only act in their economic interests when there is evidence that people can act against these, at least to some extent, in order to attain other forms of status, something epitomized by Karl Marx (1818–1883) himself who, by advocating Marxism, became celebrated but damaged his economic prospects (see Dutton & Van der Linden, 2015). It assumes that all phenomena are the products of ‘History’ and thus effectively reifies History. History can surely be reduced to the interactions between people. These will be partly underpinned by significantly genetic factors, such as intelligence and personality (see Dutton, 2014). It also makes the unlikely assumption that ‘nationalism’ was simply invented as part of a giant conspiracy theory, rather than at least having a basis in prior ways of thinking. There are a number of other Marxist theories of nationalism. American sociologist Michael Hechter (1975) advocated the ‘Internal Colonialism’ model, arguing that capitalism leads to the exploitation of ethnic minorities in a state and the resultant development of nationalism among them. Of course, even if this is true, it fails to explain nationalism among dominant ethnys, nor does it explain why nationalist conflict is more pronounced in some states, such as multiracial ones, than others, as we will see below. It raises the question of how capitalism brought a sense of ethnic nationalism into being if it did not already somehow exist.

  Problems with Constructivism

  In general, a number of problems can be highlighted with al
l of the Constructivist theories. Most obviously, they are all underpinned by cultural or environmental determinism. Even focusing on Barth, if we ask why one ethnic group has adopted one cultural practice and its neighbour another, the answer must be because they have a different history. ‘History’, as already noted, is how culture behaves within a set period of time, so if we ask why the two groups have different histories then the answer must be because they have different cultures; and they, in turn, have different cultures because they have different histories. We end up with a circular argument, which can only be solved by reifying, for example, History and conceiving of different histories being thrown from the sky like thunderbolts and landing in different cultures.

  In addition, there is a strong empirical case against cultural determinism. ‘Culture’, from an anthropological perspective, refers to a group’s way of life. Differences in how individuals live their lives have been shown to be significantly predicted by genetic factors. For example, intelligence has been shown to be around 0.8 heritable. However, intelligence predicts education level at 0.5, income at 0.3, and school achievement at 0.7 (Jensen, 1981). Intelligence is a predictor of health and longevity and, at a national level, intelligence has been shown to negatively predict religiousness, criminality, fertility, and political liberalism, and positively predict national wealth, health, average educational attainment, sanitation, and even happiness (see Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012). Indeed, research has highlighted regional differences in the prevalence of different forms of specific genes and shown that these relate to regional differences in culture. As we will see later, it has been argued that A118G (OPRM1) is a genetic basis of the fear of social exclusion. G and A polymorphisms in this gene regulate μ-opioid receptors. A study showed that fMRI subjects with the G allele showed stronger unpleasant feelings when they were excluded in ball-toss games (Way et al., 2009). Way and Lieberman (2010) found a positive correlation between the frequencies of G alleles in a population and the collectivism of their culture. They also reported that the G allele frequencies among Asian populations are much higher than those in European populations. As such, there is a sound case for arguing that cultural differences are partly genetic in origin.

  The Constructivist Theories are also highly question-begging. In the case of the Modernist theories, we must ask where this constructed ‘nationalism’ came from? Surely, it was not invented out of nothing as nothing is invented in a vacuum. Accordingly, ethnic nationalism must have some kind of a connection to an ancient past, which speaks in favour of some form of Primordialism. If, as Barth argues, the elements of ethnic identity are essentially arbitrary, then why are they relatively similar across cultures? If nationalism is imposed by the elite on the masses, then why does it sometimes take the form of a mass movement against the elite? Even if it is in fact led by those who want to become the new elite, they are not necessarily the elite in all but the most localized sense. Is it not possible, anyway, that the elite might have motivations in common with the masses, and be motivated by the good of their ethnic group rather than simply by money? And, most importantly, how can a cultural determinist model explain the extremes of self-sacrifice that people can be persuaded to engage in for the good of their ethnic group, including laying down their lives, anonymously, to invade a foreign country, despite this leading to no obvious economic benefit for their families? One possibility is that they have been ‘brainwashed’, but this raises the question of why even social animals will lay down their lives for relatively distantly related members of their group. If it is accepted that we are closely related to the chimpanzee (see Wilson, 1975), a theory is more parsimonious if it can explain both chimpanzee and human behaviour. It is most improbable that chimpanzees can brainwash each other in any complex sense as they lack the ability to speak. Furthermore, if nationhood is merely a construct imposed on the masses, then why is it that it tends to fail when a country is multi-ethnic? These countries will tend to Balkanize into separate ethnic communities, which often conceive of themselves as differing in terms of blood and ancestry (see Vanhanen, 2012). Accordingly, multi-ethnic societies tend to have an ethnic core, while other ethnic groups are more distant from the country’s sense of identity. Indeed, in multi-ethnic states where the different groups are from conspicuously different races, this breakdown is along racial lines, as has been shown in detail by Tatu Vanhanen (2012). Vanhanen has demonstrated that extent of Ethnic Conflict (defined on a scale up to severe ethnic massacres) correlates with extent of Ethnic Heterogeneity (defined as differences in visible race, language or tribe, and religion), when controlling for other variables such as socioeconomic development level and level of democracy.

  5. Primordialism

  The opposite school seeking to explain ethnicity is known as Primordialism. The classic models of Primordialism or ‘Perennialism’ were advocated in the nineteenth century during the rise in European nationalism. German Romantic nationalists, such as Johann von Herder (1744–1803), argued that the essence of a national community was ties of land, blood and language. These, argued Herder, meant that each nation was, in essence, different, and these differences were ancient, reflected in each ethnicity’s folklore and traditions. As such, even though the nation-state may be of modern origin, it has emerged from a much more ancient sense of identity (e.g. Herder, 1784). Anthropologists, such as Englishman Edward Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973), also conceived of human societies in terms of layers of relatedness, beginning with the nuclear family, then the clan and finally the ethny (e.g. Evans-Pritchard, 1940). This would seem to explain a number of the problems which we have observed in relation to Constructivism. Again, there are a number of competing Primordialist schools, divided over the extent to which they regard genetic differences as significant to their model of ethnicity.

  Ethnosymbolists

  British sociologist Anthony D. Smith (1939–2016; e.g. Smith, 2004) espoused what he called the Ethnosymbolic approach. For Smith, there is some kind of genuine ‘ethnic’ past underpinning modern conceptions of ethnic identity. Behind these identities are myths, folk memories, shared values, traditions and symbols. The most important of these myths is the myth of a ‘Golden Age’ or ‘Glorious Past’. The ‘Intellectuals’ act as chroniclers of these myths, using the arts to reawaken the imagined community, and they reawaken a sense of ethnic identity when it is needed. A different group, the ‘professionals’ or ‘intelligentsia’ disseminate the ideas. Thus, the first stage of national or ethnic identity is some kind of shared, ancient history. The second stage is a group of intellectuals who act as a bridge between the past and the present, who spawn an image of the ‘nation’. However, nationalism and ethnic identity can still exist without this second stage occurring at all.

  The difference, however, between Smith and many other Primordialists is that he advocates something close to cultural determinism, the problems with which we have already highlighted. Smith defines the ‘nation’ as ‘a named human population occupying an historic territory, and sharing myths, memories, a single public culture and common rights and duties for all members’ (Smith, 2004, p. 65). The specifics of Smith’s definition need not concern us, but it is clear that there is no engagement in Smith’s definition of ‘nation’ — and by extension ethny — with bonds of blood. This kind of definition is, thus, incongruous with what is commonly meant by an ‘ethnic’ group in common parlance: a group that is held together by a sense of common ancestry.

  Kinship Groups

  A second Primordialist school regards ethnic groups as kin networks; as highly extended families. This raises the question of what is meant by ‘family’. American political scientist Walter Connor (1994, p. 202) has emphasised that the ‘nation’ should be defined as ‘the largest group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family’. The use of the word ‘felt’ is extremely important here. From Connor’s perspective, the important issue is that members of an ethnic group
believe that they are kin; whether they are genuinely kin is a quite separate issue. That notwithstanding, there are a number of advantages to this definition. It is congruous with the shared cultural memory of common ancestry which is held by many ethnic groups, both in terms of many nation states as well as in pre-modern societies. It also assists in explaining the self-sacrificial behaviour that is associated with ethnic groups. If members genuinely believe that the group is their extended family then it follows that an element of the altruistic behaviour which they would display towards their family would also be displayed towards this highly extended family. This does not necessarily require a genetic explanation; though, as we will see, such an explanation is the most parsimonious because it explains why all social animals — not just humans — tend to behave in an altruistic way, especially towards members of their in-group. The crucial point is that members believe that they are kin and accept that they must act in an altruistic manner towards kin. This, however, raises the question of why we should be altruistic towards kin at all. Even if it is the case that enthys are extended kinship groups, and even if it is the case that such groups can be seen in the animal kingdom, why should we behave more altruistically towards kin?